Opscraft
Kubernetes in depth · Lesson 9 of 11 · 3 min read

Security: authentication, RBAC and admission

Authentication

Kubernetes has no user database. Humans authenticate with client certificates, OIDC tokens from an identity provider, or cloud mechanisms (EKS: IAM → access entries). Workloads authenticate with ServiceAccount tokens: since 1.24, pods get bound, time-limited projected tokens (audience-bound, auto-rotated) instead of long-lived Secret-based tokens. Disable mounting where not needed: automountServiceAccountToken: false.

RBAC

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata: { name: deployer, namespace: shop }
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
  resources: ["deployments"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch"]
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods", "pods/log"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata: { name: ci-deployer, namespace: shop }
subjects:
- { kind: ServiceAccount, name: ci, namespace: shop }
- { kind: Group, name: checkout-devs, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io }
roleRef: { kind: Role, name: deployer, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io }
Enlarge diagramServiceAccount cinamespace shopGroup checkout-devsfrom IAM / OIDCRoleBindingci-deployerRole deployerdeployments: get, list,update, patch · pods,pods/log: readAdditive only: there are no deny rules. Check with kubectl auth can-i.
Figure 1. RBAC in one picture: a binding connects who (a user, group or service account) to a role that lists what is allowed.
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  • Role (namespaced) vs ClusterRole (cluster-wide or reusable). RoleBinding grants within a namespace (can reference a ClusterRole to reuse it); ClusterRoleBinding grants cluster-wide.
  • RBAC is additive only — no deny rules.
  • Verbs: get, list, watch, create, update, patch, delete, deletecollection; plus special ones like escalate, bind, impersonate. Subresources: pods/exec, pods/log, deployments/scale.
  • Dangerous permissions: secrets get/list, pods/exec, creating pods (can mount any ServiceAccount or hostPath), escalate/bind, nodes/proxy, wildcard *.
  • Built-in roles: cluster-admin, admin, edit, view (aggregated).
  • Check with kubectl auth can-i create deployments -n shop --as system:serviceaccount:shop:ci and kubectl auth can-i --list.

Admission control and Pod Security

  • Pod Security Admission enforces the Pod Security Standards per namespace with labels: privileged, baseline, restricted, in modes enforce, audit, warn:
metadata:
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
  • Policy engines (Gatekeeper/OPA, Kyverno) and built-in ValidatingAdmissionPolicy (CEL) cover custom rules: allowed registries, required labels, no latest tags, resource limits required.
Enlarge diagramrestrictednon-root, no privilege escalation, dropped capabilities, seccomp: app namespacesbaselineblocks known escalations like privileged, hostPath, hostNetworkprivilegedanything goes: only for system agents
Figure 2. Pod Security Standards, from strictest (top) to most permissive. Label each namespace with the level it must meet.
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Pod securityContext

securityContext:                      # pod level
  runAsNonRoot: true
  runAsUser: 10001
  fsGroup: 10001
  seccompProfile: { type: RuntimeDefault }
containers:
- name: app
  securityContext:                    # container level
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }

Audit logging

The API server can log every request (who, what, when, result) per an audit policy. On EKS, enable the audit control plane log type to CloudWatch — essential for incident investigation ("who deleted this Deployment?").