AWS Organizations and multi-account strategy
Why multiple accounts
Accounts are the strongest isolation boundary in AWS: blast radius, separate quotas, clear billing, distinct guardrails per environment, and simpler least privilege (prod account access is a different role entirely).
Typical structure (Control Tower / landing zone)
AWS Control Tower automates the landing zone: account factory, mandatory and optional controls (preventive SCPs, detective Config rules, proactive CloudFormation hooks), centralised logging, Identity Center integration. Account Factory for Terraform (AFT) provisions accounts via Terraform pipelines.
Service Control Policies
SCPs never grant permissions; they set the maximum. Common guardrails:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "DenyOutsideApprovedRegions",
"Effect": "Deny",
"NotAction": ["iam:*", "organizations:*", "route53:*", "cloudfront:*", "sts:*", "support:*", "budgets:*"],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": { "StringNotEquals": { "aws:RequestedRegion": ["ap-south-1", "ap-southeast-1"] } }
},
{
"Sid": "ProtectSecurityTooling",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["cloudtrail:StopLogging", "cloudtrail:DeleteTrail", "guardduty:DeleteDetector", "config:StopConfigurationRecorder"],
"Resource": "*"
},
{
"Sid": "DenyLeavingOrg",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "organizations:LeaveOrganization",
"Resource": "*"
}
]
}
Other common ones: deny root user actions in member accounts, require IMDSv2 on ec2:RunInstances, deny unencrypted EBS/S3, deny creating IAM users/access keys, enforce tags on creation. Global services (IAM, Route 53, CloudFront) are exempted from region-deny with NotAction. Test SCPs in a sandbox OU first — a bad SCP can lock out every account.
SCPs don't affect the management account or service-linked roles; keep workloads out of the management account.
Identity Center (SSO)
Users/groups from an external IdP (Okta, Entra ID, Google) via SAML + SCIM; permission sets (policies + session duration) assigned to groups per account; users log in via the access portal or aws configure sso / aws sso login, and get short-lived role credentials. Break-glass access: a tightly controlled emergency role/user with alerts on use.